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MORAL JUDGMENTS IN TRADEMARK LAW 
NED SNOW* 
Under the federal Lanham Act, eligibility for trademark protection depends 
on whether a mark is sufficiently moral.  The Federal Circuit has recently held this 
provision of the Act to be unconstitutional based on its interpretation of speech 
doctrine.  The context of trademark law, however, refutes this interpretation.  
Indeed, speech doctrine appears to support this morality requirement.  Nevertheless, 
there seems to be another reason that the Federal Circuit held the morality 
requirement unconstitutional:  the judicial discomfort with morality serving as a 
basis for law.  This Essay concludes that this judicial discomfort is unjustified in 
this instance.  From both a constitutional and a policy perspective, morality may 
and should serve as a basis for denying trademark protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law exists to promote the commercial marketplace by 
regulating a certain type of speech.  To that end, the Trademark Act 
of 1946 (“Lanham Act”)1 employs several content-based criteria that 
bar trademark eligibility.2  Such criteria include inquiries into 
whether a mark is descriptive, generic, deceptive, or a government 
symbol; whether a mark resembles a living person or an existing 
mark; whether a mark is functional; and whether a mark is immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging.3  Recently, the criteria that bar trademark 
protection for immoral, scandalous, and disparaging marks—which I 
refer to as the “morality bars”—has come under constitutional attack.  
In In re Tam,4 a majority of an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit held that the morality bars violate the First 
Amendment.5  Yet in the face of the other content-based bars in 
trademark law, coupled with the lengthy history of the morality bars, 
the majority’s holding is puzzling.6  The context of trademark law 
seems to justify the seeming offense to free speech.7  For if the 
morality bars violate free speech, it would seem that the other 
                                                          
 1. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141n (2012)). 
 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (imposing limitations on the issuance of trademarks); 
Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639, 1641 (2016) 
(“[T]rademark law recognizes other content-based criteria as conditions for 
trademark registration and has done so for more than a century.”); Rebecca 
Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar:  Trademark Registration and Free Speech, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 383 (2016) (“[D]isparagement can’t coherently be 
distinguished from a number of the other bars to registration once the harsh logic of 
the First Amendment applies.”). 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1052. 
 4. 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 5. Id. at 1327–28. 
 6. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1640–41 (noting that Tam did not address the 
holding’s consistency within the broader context of trademark law).  Compare In re 
Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling the anti-
immoral criterion of the Lanham Act does not violate the First Amendment), 
abrogated by Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (same), abrogated by Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, and In re McGinley, 660 
F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (same), abrogated by Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, with Tam, 808 
F.3d at 1327–28 (holding that the First Amendment does not allow the government 
to refuse to register disparaging marks simply because the government disapproves 
of the expressive messages conveyed by the marks). 
 7. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1640–42. 
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content-based criteria do as well.8  On the basis of speech, it is 
difficult to distinguish the morality bars from other content-based 
bars in trademark law.9 
This is not to say that the morality bars are indistinguishable from 
the other content-based criteria that determine trademark eligibility.  
To the contrary, the morality bars reflect the only criteria that require 
the government to consider issues of morality in determining 
trademark protection.  This distinction, I believe, lies at the heart of 
the Tam holding.  Indeed, the Tam majority expressed uneasiness 
with the government making “moral judgments” to determine 
trademark eligibility.10  Reading between the lines of Tam, as well as 
reading some particular lines of Tam, I infer that the majority 
disapproves of Congress legislating morality in a context that affects 
speech.11  This leads me to believe that Tam is as much about 
legislating morality as it is about free speech.  Tam may be viewed 
from either a speech paradigm or a morality paradigm.  In the end, 
however, neither paradigm justifies the majority’s holding.  I argue 
that the morality bars reflect good policy and are constitutional. 
This Essay addresses the speech and morality paradigms of Tam in 
two parts.  Part I addresses the speech paradigm.  In that Part, I 
briefly summarize the argument against finding a speech violation.12  
Part I provides the proper framework for discussing the morality 
paradigm in Part II.  In Part II, I consider whether Congress can and 
should employ moral judgments to determine trademark eligibility.  
The Essay concludes that Tam was incorrectly decided:  the morality 
bars are constitutional regulations of commercial speech and further 
the purpose of trademark law. 
I. SPEECH 
The Tam majority recited First Amendment jurisprudence that, 
outside the context of trademark law, might seem to condemn the 
morality bars.13  Context, however, is everything in speech law.14  
                                                          
 8. See id. at 1640–42, 1678–82 (explaining that the Tam majority’s holding 
suggests that the Lanham Act’s anti-deception provision also violates the First 
Amendment as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
 11. See id. 
 12. For a more in-depth discussion of the speech violation argument, see 
generally Snow, supra note 2. 
 13. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334–57 (finding that the disparagement provision 
“chills private speech,” is “not content or viewpoint neutral,” regulates expression, 
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Ignoring the context of the morality bars (i.e., marks designating 
commercial source) is akin to ignoring the context of a man shouting 
fire (i.e., in a building that is ablaze as opposed to a crowded theatre 
that is not).15  The context in which trademark arises demonstrates 
that the morality bars must be constitutional as a matter of free 
speech law.  The intricacies of that context, and its implication on 
speech law, I address in a separate work.16  Here, I only summarize 
the general points of the context to aid my discussion in Part II about 
the Tam morality paradigm. 
When a person uses a trademark to represent herself as the source 
of a good or service, she is speaking.  She is expressing the idea of her 
identity as the source.17  A bus company chooses GREYHOUND.  A 
car company chooses MERCEDEZ.  A restaurant company chooses 
CHICK-FIL-A.  Each company communicates meaning through the 
mark.  Specifically, the mark communicates how consumers should 
conceptualize the company that is the source of certain goods or 
services.  The mark communicates the reputation of the company.  
And in many cases, it communicates a characteristic of the good that 
the company is offering for sale (e.g., CHICK-FIL-A suggests that the 
restaurant sells chicken).  Marks serve as an expression of meaning.18  
They represent speech. 
The conclusion that marks represent speech suggests that any 
content-based restrictions on trademark eligibility lie in tension with 
the right of free speech.  If I start a restaurant that serves chicken filets, 
free speech principles suggest that I should be able to call my 
restaurant whatever I choose, including CHICK-FIL-A (even though 
another restaurant company already uses that same mark).  Yet 
                                                          
fails strict scrutiny, and fails the test for commercial speech regulation, and that 
trademarks are “not government speech” or “government subsid[ies]”). 
 14. See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) 
(explaining that First Amendment jurisprudence distinguishes speech restrictions 
based upon the type of speech the prohibition targets and how it applies to that 
speech as well as the government interests supporting the restriction); Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“But the character of every act depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is done.” (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 
205–06 (1904)). 
 15. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 16. See generally Snow, supra note 2. 
 17. See id. at 1648–51. 
 18. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209–10 (2000) 
(interpreting the Lanham Act’s designation that any “symbol” or “device” may serve 
as a trademark to mean that the scope of trademark protection encompasses “almost 
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning” (emphasis added) (quoting Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995))). 
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trademark law denies me such an opportunity to speak.  Furthermore, 
trademark law withholds the benefits of registration to speakers who 
use specific categories of content to identify themselves.  For instance, 
trademark law denies me the benefits of registration if I seek to identify 
myself with a mark that someone else has already registered; with a 
mark that is generic or descriptive relevant to the product I am selling; 
with a mark that is disparaging, scandalous, or immoral; or even with a 
mark that constitutes my own surname.19  Such restrictions on self-
identification would seem to violate the fundamental free-speech 
principle that prohibits content-based restrictions.20 
Of course the First Amendment does not provide an absolute right 
of free speech.21  Exceptions may arise based on the context of the 
speech:  Supreme Court jurisprudence well recognizes that 
exceptional contexts permit the government to impose content-based 
restrictions on speech.22  Such an exception must exist for trademark 
law, for if trademark law were not an exception to free speech’s 
prohibition of content-based restrictions, none of the content-based 
criteria for eligibility would be constitutional.23  Simply put, if 
trademark registration is to exist, speech law must yield.  And speech 
law does yield.  Three speech doctrines allow for the content-based 
restrictions of trademark law to be consistent with the right of free 
speech.  The doctrines of government subsidies, commercial speech, 
and the limited-public forum appear to allow for the sort of content-
                                                          
 19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012). 
 20. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (“Content-based 
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are 
presumptively unconstitutional . . . .”). 
 21. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (noting that “[r]estraints are 
permitted for appropriate reasons”). 
 22. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) 
(recognizing a limited-public forum exception in which the government may more 
readily restrict speech occurring through a state-funded student-organization 
program); Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007) (“[I]t is well 
established that the government can make content-based distinctions when it 
subsidizes speech.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (upholding government regulation of commercial 
speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam) 
(upholding the prohibition of speech that would incite “imminent lawless action”); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (allowing the regulation of obscene 
speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (permitting local 
governments to curtail “fighting words”). 
 23. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1641; Tushnet, supra note 2, at 383–84. 
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based restrictions that arise in trademark law.24  The relevant 
question here is whether the morality bars in particular fall within 
these doctrinal exceptions to free-speech law. 
A. Government Subsidy 
Government may draw content-based distinctions when it 
subsidizes private speech through a government program.25  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “Government may allocate competitive 
funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct 
regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake.”26  Restrictions in 
a government program that affect speech content are permissible 
insofar as those restrictions support the purpose of the program.27 
Trademark registration represents a government program that 
subsidizes private speech.  The trademark system provides mark 
owners a subsidy, in the form of a property right, that affects speech 
content.28  As a general matter, content-based restrictions within the 
subsidy program of trademark registration are permissible because 
the restrictions support the purpose of trademark law—i.e., they 
promote efficiency and growth in the commercial marketplace.29 
With respect to the morality bars specifically, the restrictions 
support growth in the commercial marketplace by facilitating an 
                                                          
 24. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1644–46.  None of these three exceptions allow the 
government to engage in viewpoint discrimination.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).  Hence, the question arises as to 
whether the morality bars constitute viewpoint discrimination.  I address that 
question in another work, concluding that Tam’s finding of viewpoint discrimination 
is not compatible with the broader principles of trademark law.  See Snow, supra note 
2, at 1677–83. 
 25. See Davenport, 551 U.S. at 188–89 (“[I]t is well established that the 
government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech.”); Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (“Congress may 
‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest . . . .’” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). 
 26. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88. 
 27. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2329–30 (2013) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 196). 
 28. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Dyk, J., 
concurring and dissenting), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); Snow, supra note 2, at 
1645.  But see Tam, 808 F.3d at 1353 (rejecting the notion that trademark registration 
is a subsidy). 
 29. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) 
(discussing the economic benefits of trademark law); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2016) (same); 
Snow, supra note 2, at 1667–70, 1674 (same). 
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environment that is more conducive to commercial transactions.  
Presumably, most commercial actors would rather not engage in a 
commercial forum that promotes name-calling and displays of 
immoral conduct.  Personal offense to such marks might disrupt an 
otherwise efficient transaction—a potential buyer refusing to 
purchase a good based on its mark.  This situation could lead to 
uncertainty regarding market demand for the good represented by 
the mark.30  In short, disparaging, immoral, and scandalous marks 
may produce uncertainty in market transactions.  Congress’s refusal 
to subsidize such marks therefore appears justifiable on the grounds 
that its refusal promotes efficiency in the commercial marketplace. 
B. Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech occurs where a speaker uses expression to propose 
a commercial transaction.31  The government may impose a content-based 
restriction on commercial speech so long as the government is reasonably 
advancing a substantial interest through that restriction.32 
Trademarks are commercial speech.33  By indicating the source of a 
product, trademarks facilitate commercial transactions.34  Restrictions 
on trademarks, then, are permissible if Congress is reasonably 
advancing a substantial interest through the restrictions.  As a general 
matter, the restrictions on trademarks appear to reasonably advance 
the substantial interests of promoting efficiency and growth in the 
commercial marketplace.  For instance, the restriction that requires 
marks to be distinct35 promotes efficiency by reducing search costs for 
consumers, and it promotes growth by fostering reputational 
incentives for producers.36 
Under this commercial-speech test, the morality bars seem justified.  
Marks that are immoral, scandalous, or disparaging are offensive to 
                                                          
 30. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1379 (Reyna, J., dissenting); infra text accompanying 
notes 37–39. 
 31. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 562–63 (1980). 
 32. Id. at 564. 
 33. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539–40 (1987). 
 34. See id. 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)–(f) (2012). 
 36. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In 
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying 
mark, reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions, 
for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this 
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she 
liked (or disliked) in the past.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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segments of society.  This offense may cause some consumers to refrain 
from purchasing goods or services that they would otherwise purchase.  
In that situation, the mark would interfere with a realization of the 
optimum level of consumer demand, thereby affecting pricing and 
supply.37  The offensive mark would create an inefficient outcome, 
which would harm the government’s substantial interest in growth of 
the commercial marketplace. 
This view of the morality bars—as criteria that prevent disruption 
to commercial activity—finds support in Judge Reyna’s dissenting 
opinion in Tam.  He stated, “Commercial speech that insults groups 
of people, particularly based on their race, gender, religion, or other 
demographic identity, tends to disrupt commercial activity and to 
undermine the stability of the marketplace in much the same manner 
as discriminatory conduct.”38  Simply put, to further participation in 
commercial transactions, Congress has barred offensive marks from 
registration eligibility.39  The morality bars, then, facilitate an 
environment of trade that is non-offensive to members of society, 
which fosters an environment that is more conducive to participation 
in commercial transactions.  Such restrictions would appear 
constitutional under the commercial-speech doctrine. 
C. Limited-Public Forum 
Another exception to the free-speech prohibition on content-based 
restrictions is the limited-public forum doctrine.40  A limited-public 
forum arises where the government has created a forum (or provided 
resources) that furthers private speech on a particular topic.41  The 
government may impose content-based speech restrictions on the 
public’s use of the forum—or on the public’s use of the government-
provided resources—insofar as the restriction confines the forum to 
its limited and legitimate purposes.42 
                                                          
 37. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1670–73. 
 38. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Reyna, J., 
dissenting), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 41. See id.; see also Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 
655 (1981) (declaring the Minnesota State Fair a limited-public forum for the purpose of 
“exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, 
or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion”). 
 42. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (“The necessities of confining a forum to the 
limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in 
reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
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This doctrine arguably applies in the trademark context.43  The system 
of trademark law may represent a limited-public forum, albeit a sort of 
metaphysical government-created forum—or more precisely, 
government-provided resources.44  Trademark rights represent a 
government resource that facilitates the speech of private actors, and 
Congress has provided that resource to promote commercial transactions. 
Assuming that trademark rights represent such a forum, 
restrictions on trademark speech would be permissible to the extent 
that the restrictions serve to confine trademark rights to the purpose 
of promoting commercial transactions.  An example of such a 
justifiable restriction (although not necessarily justifiable under the 
commercial-speech doctrine) is the bar preventing registration of 
government symbols:  Congress has decided that government symbols 
may not receive trademark protection.45  According to commentators, 
the reason that Congress imposed this bar is that government 
symbols should “not be sullied or debased by use as symbols in 
business and trade.”46  Government symbols are apparently too 
sacrosanct to be the subject of a commercial transaction—even where 
a government entity seeks trademark protection for its own symbol.47  
Thus, Congress has judged that government symbols fall outside the 
purpose of the forum of trademark rights that it created.  Tellingly, 
trademarking government symbols would not diminish the efficiency 
of the marketplace; indeed, consumers of government services could 
more easily identify a government actor in the absence of third 
parties imitating a government-symbol mark.48  Nevertheless, by 
barring trademark rights for government symbols, Congress has 
confined trademark rights to content that Congress deems within the 
purpose of the commercial forum.  The government-symbols bar is 
justified under the limited-public forum doctrine. 
Like the government-symbols bar, the morality bars appear to 
constitute a permissible speech restriction within the limited-public 
                                                          
 43. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1646–47. 
 44. See id. at 1646–47 & n.57 (analogizing trademark rights to the government-
provided benefits for student groups held to be a limited-public forum in Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2012). 
 46. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 29, § 19:78. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See In re City of Hous., 731 F.3d 1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (denying trademark 
protection for Houston’s city seal despite the City’s argument that the trademark would 
promote efficiency by preventing the seal’s use by “pirates and cheats”). 
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forum of trademark.49  The morality bars serve the purpose of the 
trademark forum—promoting the commercial marketplace—by 
reducing instances of offense that would impede marketplace 
transactions.50  They also limit the promotion of goodwill through 
trademark rights to those markholders who do not hinder 
marketplace transactions.  The morality bars thereby confine 
trademark rights to the purpose of promoting commerce.51  Thus, 
the doctrine of the limited-public forum suggests the constitutionality 
of the morality bars as a speech restriction. 
II. MORALITY 
Despite the fact that speech doctrines do not appear to provide a 
basis for distinguishing the morality bars from other content-based 
criteria in trademark law, the morality bars are distinguishable from 
these criteria in one obvious way:  they require the government to 
make moral judgments.  To determine whether a mark is immoral, 
scandalous, or disparaging, a Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
examiner must draw upon moral norms of society.  No other criterion 
for trademark protection introduces value judgments that are based on 
standards of decency, goodness, and virtue.  This distinction, I believe, 
was particularly troublesome for the Tam majority. 
Before going further, I should define morality here.  By morality, I 
mean that which leads a person or a society to realize a more virtuous 
life.52  Morality suggests standards of goodness, decency, and virtue.  I 
employ this meaning to consider whether the government can and 
should make moral judgments in deciding trademark eligibility. 
A. The Majority’s Problem with Moral Judgments 
That the government must make moral judgments in deciding 
trademark registration appears to have mattered to the majority in 
Tam.53  While arguing that the disparagement bar targets expressive 
content, the majority took issue with the moral judgments that that 
criterion invokes.54  Interestingly, the majority’s conclusion that the 
                                                          
 49. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1675–77. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. The morality to which I refer is that which Professor Lon Fuller describes as the 
“morality of aspiration.”  See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5, 8–9 (rev. ed. 1969). 
 53. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 54. See id. 
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disparagement bar targets expressive content is not remarkable, for 
whenever the PTO denies registration on the grounds that a mark 
does not satisfy any criterion for protection under the Lanham Act—
not just the morality bars—the PTO is targeting expressive content—
namely, the expression of the source’s identity.55  What is remarkable, 
though, is a statement by the majority concerning “moral 
judgments.”56  In particular, the majority analyzed two marks for 
which the PTO denied registration, HEEB and SQUAW VALLEY, and 
in doing so, the majority referred to the moral judgments that the 
government made in denying registration: 
It was these expressive messages [in the HEEB and SQUAW VALLEY 
marks] that the government found objectionable, and that led the 
government to refuse to register or to cancel the marks.  In doing so, 
the government made moral judgments based solely and indisputably 
on the marks’ expressive content.  Every single time registration is 
refused or cancelled pursuant to the disparagement provision, it is 
based upon a determination by the government that the expressive 
content of the message is unsuitable because it would be viewed by 
the referenced group as disparaging them.57 
Importantly, to conclude that the PTO targeted expressive content 
in HEEB and SQUAW VALLEY, the majority did not need to cite that 
the government made “moral judgments” or found the message 
“unsuitable.”  The majority could have explained that in choosing 
these marks, the markholders were communicating both the identity 
of the good’s source and a message about the referenced group such 
that the bar against disparaging marks was targeting expressive 
content.  Indeed, the topic sentence of the paragraph containing the 
above quotation indicates the majority’s disapproval of only 
expressive content serving as a basis for denial—not of the 
government’s employment of moral judgments.58  The presence of 
moral judgments thus seems unnecessary to arrive at the conclusion 
that the disparaging bar targets expressive content.  That the 
government makes moral judgments or determinations of 
unsuitability adds nothing to further the conclusion that the 
disparaging bar targets expression. 
                                                          
 55. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1648–55.  See generally 17 U.S.C. 1052 (2012). 
 56. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
 57. Id. (emphases added). 
 58. The topic sentence of the paragraph states:  “Importantly, every time the PTO 
refuses to register a mark under § 2(a) [which sets forth the morality bars], it does so 
because it believes the mark conveys an expressive message—a message that is 
disparaging to certain groups.”  Id. 
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Why, then, does the majority refer to the government making 
“moral judgments” as well as the government’s determination that 
content is “unsuitable”?  Given that these facts are not necessary for 
the majority’s conclusion about expressive content, these facts 
suggest an additional reason for condemning the disparagement bar.  
That is, the majority’s calling attention to moral judgments suggests 
that the majority finds further reprehensibility in the disparagement 
bar.  So apparently for the majority, the PTO’s actions are worse than 
merely targeting expressive content because the PTO is making 
“moral judgments” to decide what is “unsuitable.”  Hence, trademark 
registration represents the government imposing its own morality, 
and that possibility the majority simply cannot accept. 
Assuming that this interpretation of the majority’s position is 
correct, I do not believe that the majority’s position is altogether 
groundless.  Moral values can be diverse across a culturally diverse 
society.  This diversity of moral values is evident even among the PTO 
examiners who apply the disparagement bar as they have manifested 
inconsistent understandings of what is suitable and what is not.59  
Moral judgments can be subjective and personal.  Consequently, the 
government should not impose its view of morality on the masses; 
more specifically, the government should not be defining whether 
speech content is moral enough to receive a property benefit, 
especially where the content demonstrates sufficient value to receive 
constitutional protection as speech.  The majority’s objection to 
moral judgments thus makes sense.  Moral views vary, so each 
individual should be able to make moral judgments for himself.  The 
government should not be a gatekeeper for trademark morality. 
Under this anti-moral-judgment argument, a laissez-faire approach 
to trademark registration seems appropriate.  Rather than the 
government imposing its morals, consumers should decide for 
themselves whether they find a given mark offensive.  If a mark were 
so disparaging that consumers disagreed with its content, consumers 
would not purchase the product that corresponds to the mark; the 
mark owner, in turn, would fail to realize a commercial benefit 
because of the disparaging content, and thereby he would lack 
incentive to continue using the disparaging mark.  On the other 
hand, if a sufficient number of consumers were to purchase a product 
                                                          
 59. See id. at 1342 n.7 (exemplifying the inconsistencies in mark registrations and 
denials, such as denying protection for HAVE YOU HEARD SATAN IS A 
REPUBLICAN as a disparaging mark but registering the mark THE DEVIL IS A 
DEMOCRAT). 
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containing an otherwise “unsuitable” mark, the mark’s success in the 
marketplace would demonstrate that the government’s moral 
assessment was incorrect—that a sufficient amount of the public does 
approve of the message.60  Popular opinion would demonstrate the 
suitability of a mark.  Therefore, if the mark offends the public, the 
mark will cause failure in the marketplace, whereas if the mark does 
not offend enough of the public, the mark will not impede commercial 
success.  This laissez-faire approach prevents one government official’s 
view from standing in the way of the public’s choice. 
B. Participation in Commerce 
Although this laissez-faire approach promotes individual choice, it 
does so at the cost of a collective benefit in the forum of commerce.  
As discussed below, that cost is great, and indeed, too great to justify. 
Commerce, of course, is about engaging in transactions that may 
provide economic benefit.  But more than that, commerce represents 
a system that causes social interaction between people who hold 
disparate views on important issues, coming from different 
backgrounds and cultures.61  Commerce creates bridges across deeply 
held and opposing beliefs.  It tempers extreme passions in exchange 
for a practical outcome.  Indeed, people provide and receive benefits 
to and from those with whom they disagree on every other issue.  
Religion, ideology, and political party all yield to commerce.  
Commerce, then, does more than simply provide economic benefit.  
It represents a means for promoting civil dialogue and social 
agreement across disparate belief systems.  It is integral to the fabric 
of a peaceful society.62 
Immoral and disparaging marks tend to disrupt this social benefit 
of a well-functioning commercial system.  Those marks tend to create 
an atmosphere and an environment that thwarts universal 
participation in commercial transactions.  Specifically, a mark that 
                                                          
 60. This statement perhaps oversimplifies the analysis.  A sizeable minority may 
be sufficient to sustain a disparaging mark such that the government’s moral 
assessment of the public’s view may correctly reflect the majority view even though a 
minority of the public continues to make the mark profitable.  In that situation, 
there may be lost opportunities for commercial transactions by the majority who find 
a mark offensive.  For a fuller discussion, see Snow, supra note 2, at 1671–72. 
 61. See Commerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 62. Cf. Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 658, 666–67 
(1996) (observing that “[t]he relationship between free trade and peace has been 
noted for centuries by observers such as Immanuel Kant, Charles Montesquieu, and 
John Stuart Mill” (footnotes omitted)). 
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disparages a group sends a message that the group is not respected.  
Likewise, a mark that is pornographically immoral or scandalous 
sends a message that women are to be viewed as objects, devoid of 
dignity or respect as persons.  Hence, disparaging and immoral 
content suggests that certain groups of persons are not respected and 
lack human dignity.  Within the context of a trademark, this message 
of disrespect and indignity reduces the effectiveness of the 
commercial forum.  The commercial transaction, which is supposed 
to facilitate universal cooperation, becomes a means to promote 
disrespect and indignity towards certain groups.  Immoral and 
disparaging marks are thus contrary to the socially beneficial purpose 
of a commercial system. 
Given that these marks undermine this social benefit of commerce, 
how should the law treat these marks?  A law that facilitates 
registration of immoral and disparaging marks implies that the 
government accepts—even assists—the sort of speech that disrupts 
the fundamental societal benefit of a well-functioning commercial 
system.  In the absence of the morality bars, commerce would no 
longer represent a forum that invites universal participation.  Even 
assuming that some individual consumers would realize utility from 
immoral and disparaging marks, that increase in individual utility 
would be at the expense of the collective benefit that comes from a 
wholesome, non-offensive forum of trade.  The law, then, should bar 
immoral and disparaging marks because they undermine the social 
benefit of commerce:  a means for facilitating cooperation by persons 
holding divergent beliefs and backgrounds. 
C. The Market 
Not only do the morality bars draw support from the social-benefit 
perspective, they also draw support from a market perspective.  The 
morality bars prevent market failures in the general commercial 
marketplace.  Every market is subject to failures.  To prevent failures, 
the government intervenes in a variety of markets:  environmental, 
financial, transportation, education, and health to name only a few.63  
Even the marketplace of ideas is subject to government 
intervention.64  The marketplace for commercial trade is no different.  
                                                          
 63. See, e.g., Len M. Nichols, Government Intervention in Health Care Markets Is Practical, 
Necessary, and Morally Sound, 40 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 547, 550–51 (2012) (providing the 
economic justifications for state intervention within the health care market). 
 64. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964, 965 (1978) (“Just as real world conditions prevent the laissez-faire 
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It, too, is subject to market failures.  The government must regulate 
commerce—and specifically marks indicating source—to prevent an 
inefficient allocation of resources. 
The benefit of government intervention in trademark law is clear.  
Suppose that two companies choose the same mark to represent the 
same good.  Consumers would not easily be able to distinguish the 
two companies resulting in some consumers holding imperfect 
information about companies and their goods.  The possibility of 
such imperfect information would increase the transaction cost of 
correctly identifying a source of goods.  Market inefficiencies would 
thus result.  Hence, to alleviate this failure, the government restricts 
the use of trademarks. 
The morality bars in trademark law alleviate other potential market 
failures.  Consider a disparaging mark:  Neither the producer nor the 
consumer of the mark (and the corresponding good) likely account 
for the decrease in utility to members of the group that the mark 
disparages.  In that situation, a negative externality may result from 
the disparagement.65  The producer and consumer would fail to 
account for the cost of the disparaging mark to the group.  This 
failure would result in the producer and consumer overvaluing the 
mark.  The market would thereby fail to capture the decrease in 
social utility that results from the disparagement. 
Consider a scandalously pornographic mark:  It is possible that 
pornographic marks may lead some consumers to addictive behaviors 
that harm their marriages and families.66  Where that possibility is 
                                                          
economic market—praised as a social means to facilitate optimal allocation and 
production of goods—from achieving the socially desired results, critics of the classic 
marketplace of ideas theory point to factors that prevent it from successfully 
facilitating the discovery of truth or generating proper social perspectives and 
decisions.”); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas:  A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 5, 15–17 (describing the laissez-faire economic model that free-speech theory 
follows and criticizing that model for employing faulty assumptions); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:  What Copyright Has in Common with 
Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 44 (2000) (observing that speech regulation can improve the 
functioning of the speech market to increase the aggregate amount of choice among 
competing ideas). 
 65. A negative externality represents a cost incurred by a third party to a 
transaction.  See Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61.  The first and 
second parties directly involved in the transaction fail to account for, or internalize, 
the cost that the third party indirectly incurs from the transaction. 
 66. See Kirk Doran & Joseph Price, Pornography and Marriage, 35 J. FAM. & ECON. 
ISSUES 489, 495–96 (2014) (finding that the use of pornographic material is 
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likely, it is further possible that a consumer of the pornographic mark 
may not realize the likelihood of those consequences.  In that 
situation, the consumer would base his decision to consume 
pornography on imperfect information:  he would fail to account for 
the likelihood of negative consequences.  This failure could also lead 
the consumer to overvalue the mark.  The consumer would value only 
the immediate consequence of consumption, failing to account for the 
long-term effects on his marriage and family relationships.  Hence, 
imperfect information about pornographic marks could lead to 
consumers overvaluing such marks, producing an inefficient outcome. 
Disparaging and immoral marks may therefore be overvalued due 
to market failure.  In an attempt to correct this problem, the 
government refuses to extend exclusive rights to disparaging marks, 
which reduces their value for producers.  The morality bars thus 
represent a means for the government (even if paternalistic) to 
correct failures in the commercial marketplace.  Nevertheless, even 
without exclusive rights in those marks, producers may still value 
them if consumer demand for the marks is sufficiently high.  So even 
in the absence of the exclusive rights, producers may continue to use 
disparaging or immoral marks.  For example, if the PTO denies 
protection for REDSKINS as a disparaging mark, the Washington 
football organization may nevertheless continue to use the mark 
because of the high value its fans place on it.  For the football 
organization, the market demand for the REDSKINS mark might 
outweigh the absence of exclusive rights in that mark.  Thus, even in 
the absence of enforceable trademark rights, market participants 
might still realize utility from an offensive mark but only if those 
participants place a sufficiently high value on it.  In that scenario, the 
market would overcome Congress’s attempt to curb offensive marks. 
D. The Constitutionality of Morality 
That the morality bars are justified as a matter of policy does not 
imply that they are constitutional.  Does Congress have constitutional 
authority to legislate the morality bars?  The simple answer is yes 
insofar as Congress is acting under an enumerated power (i.e., the 
Commerce Clause)67 and does not violate a fundamental right.68  In 
                                                          
associated with less marital satisfaction and summarizing other research on 
pornography’s effect on marriages and families). 
 67. Congress’s trademark authority is supported by the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94–96 (1879). 
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Sections B and C of this Part, I explain how the morality bars 
promote the commercial marketplace, indicating that Congress is 
acting within the scope of the Commerce Clause.69  And as I explain 
in Part I, free-speech doctrines suggest that the morality bars do not 
violate the fundamental right of free speech.70  Indeed, the morality 
bars do not resemble the sort of legislation that, under a morality 
justification, has been held to violate a fundamental right.  The 
morality bars, for instance, do not withhold a benefit from a group in 
a way that creates a social stigma.71  They do not criminalize private 
behavior,72 nor do they compel individuals to adopt a moral view.73  
Rather, the morality bars represent Congress exercising its right “to 
maintain a decent society” within the forum of commercial trade—a 
right that the Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts.74 
On further reflection, we might ask whether legislation that calls 
for the government to make moral judgments necessarily implies a 
violation of a fundamental right.  This seems to be the position of the 
Tam majority.  Indeed, the majority’s condemnation of moral 
judgments suggests that it believed there could be no justification for 
the disparagement bar.  Apparently for the majority, if morality 
legislation affects speech content, there must be a speech violation. 
The apparent position of the majority might be interpreted as 
raising two very different questions.  The majority’s position may raise 
the question of whether Congress may legislate a moral view without 
any other justification for the law other than the moral stance of the 
popular majority.  On the other hand, the majority’s position may 
                                                          
 68. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (“That the State may do 
much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, 
mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights 
which must be respected.”). 
 69. See Snow, supra note 2, at 1668–70. 
 70. See generally id. 
 71. Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The avowed 
purpose and practical effect of the [Defense of Marriage Act] are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex 
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”). 
 72. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled 
to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”). 
 73. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First 
Amendment does not permit [the government] to impose special prohibitions on 
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1973) (“[T]here 
is a ‘right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society . . . .’” (quoting 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting))). 
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raise a very different question:  whether Congress may rely on 
considerations of morality in furtherance of a commercial purpose.  
The answer to the first question may be that the legislated moral view 
implies a violation of a fundamental right or, at least, lies outside the 
authority of Congress.  That first question, however, is not relevant to 
the morality bars.  The morality bars do not represent legislation that 
exists solely to implement a moral view.  They represent legislation 
that is justified by a reason central to the proliferation and efficiency 
of the commercial marketplace, and that reason relies on 
considerations of morality.75 
The answer to the second question—whether Congress may rely on 
considerations of morality in furtherance of a commercial purpose—
seems clear under precedent and practice.  The presence of morality 
does not imply the absence of a context that would constitutionally 
justify a law.  Moral judgments often shape law.  For example, the law 
permits school districts to choose curriculum that teaches decency 
and civility to students, and moral judgments define those 
standards.76  Another example is the Federal Communications 
Commission regulating speech over publicly available radio and 
television stations.  Speech within this context is subject to 
prohibitions of indecent and profane content, and moral judgments 
are necessary to define indecency and profanity.77  Or consider state 
laws that restrict persons from engaging in indecent exposure.  Moral 
judgments are necessary to give meaning to public decency law.78  
And as a general matter, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
                                                          
 75. As stated in Part I, where marks offend moral views, the offense threatens the 
collective benefit of the commercial marketplace.  See supra Sections I.A–B. 
 76. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 871 (1982) (plurality opinion) 
(recognizing “that local school boards must be permitted to establish and apply their 
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values, and that there is a 
legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and 
traditional values be they social, moral, or political” and to that end, noting the 
“discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of their 
schools” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 77. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740, 748–51 (1978) (finding that 
“the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted 
standards of morality”). 
 78. See United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (“The 
important government interest [in the public indecency statute] is the widely 
recognized one of protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of 
society that still does not want to be exposed willy-nilly to public displays of various 
portions of their fellow citizens’ anatomies that traditionally in this society have been 
regarded as erogenous zones.  These still include (whether justifiably or not in the 
eyes of all) the female, but not the male, breast.”). 
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legislature may enact laws to promote its social interest in “order and 
morality.”79  Morality, then, does not diminish the strength of a 
context that would justify a speech restriction.  More generally, 
morality does not imply a violation of a fundamental right. 
So, may Congress refrain from extending a commercial benefit to 
businesses that use expletives, hate speech, and pornography in their 
offers of sale?  The answer is simple:  Because the marketplace is 
more conducive to commercial transactions in the absence of these 
sorts of expressions, the government may permissibly discourage 
their use—regardless of the fact that moral judgments must be made 
to define the expressions.  Merely because expletives, hate speech, 
and pornography are defined by moral judgments does not make 
them immune from commercial regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
The morality bars neither offend the First Amendment nor reflect 
an unconstitutional basis for law.  As to speech concerns, they are no 
more restrictive of trademark speech than any of the other content-
based restrictions on trademark registration.  The morality bars are 
permissible under the speech doctrines of government subsidy, 
commercial speech, or limited-public forum.  As a matter of general 
constitutional interpretation, the Constitution does not preclude 
Congress from relying on morality considerations if those 
considerations do not violate a fundamental right.  Indeed, moral 
considerations are integral to many laws, even laws that affect speech.  
Trademark registration is no different. 
Moreover, the morality bars reflect good policy.  Although they do 
represent the government interfering with individuals making their 
own choices regarding the value of immoral, scandalous, or 
disparaging marks, that interference is well justified.  First, the 
morality bars ensure a collective societal benefit of commerce—i.e., 
they promote broad participation by members of society who hold 
diverse beliefs and backgrounds.  Second, the morality bars cure 
market failures that prevent individual consumers from realizing the 
                                                          
 79. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added in Roth)); e.g., McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 436 (1961) (“Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are 
upheld, not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of 
religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons from the physical and 
moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710 (1885))). 
SNOW.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  3:58 PM 
1112 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1093 
most efficient valuation of marks.  Like any other instance of 
government intervention in the marketplace, the cost to individual 
autonomy must be weighed against collective and individual benefits 
that the intervention may achieve.  The benefits here outweigh the 
costs.  The morality bars are justified. 
